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LABOR LAW
When Can A Union Ask Consumers Not To
Shop AtA Shopping Mall?
By jay E. Grenig
Edwaind 5. DeBartolo Corp.
V.
Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO
(Docket No. 86-1461)
ArguedJanuary 20, 1988
ISSUES
This case presents the difficult question of what restric-
tions can be placed on a labor union's practice of passing out
handbills asking customers not to patronize a shopping
mall.
FACTS
For a short time in 1979 and 1980, the Florida Gulf Coast
Building and Construction Trades Council (Union) passed
out handbills to customers at a shopping mall owned by the
Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, asking the customers not
to patronize the stores in the mall because High Construc-
tion Company was building a department store for a tenant
there and allegedly paying substandard wages. The handbills
asked customers not to shop at any of the stores in the mall
"because of the mall ownership's contribution to substan-
dard wages."
DeBartolo filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging that
the Union was engaging in a secondary boycott in violation
of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Although the Board's General Counsel issued a complaint,
the National Labor Relations Board dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the handbilling was protected by the
publicity proviso exception to section 8(b) (4).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the Board's action (662 F.2d 264 (1981)), but the
Supreme Court reversed (463 U.S. 147 (1983)). The Su-
preme Court held that the publicity proviso did not protect
the Union's handbilling. The case was returned to the Board
to determine whether the handbilling was proscribed by the
Act and, if so, whether the Act violated the First Amendment.
Subsequently, the Board concluded that the Union had
engaged in coercive conduct which Congress had "intended
to proscribe" and that "this proscription accords with the
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Constitution." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Board, determining that
if the Act were construed to prohibit handbilling "serious
constitutional issues will arise," that there was "no affirma-
tive intention of Congress clearly expressed to prohibit
[handbilling or other] nonpicketing labor publicity" and that
absent such intent, the Act only prohibited picketing (796
F.2d 1328 (1986)).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations
Act prohibits a union from engaging in certain secondary
activity. The secondary boycott provisions of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) are among the most difficult in the Act to
interpret and apply.
Secondary activity includes a union's use of coercion
against an employer (neutral employer) to further the
union's objectives in a labor dispute with another employer
(primary employer). In a secondary boycott, the union's
purpose is to coerce a neutral employer to cease doing
business with the secondary employer.
A union having a dispute with a primary employer some-
times desires to encourage consumers not to purchase the
primary employer's goods distributed by neutral employers.
The publicity proviso to section 8(b)(4) allows a union to
engage in publicity other than picketing (such as passing
handbills), truthfully advising the public that a good pro-
duced by a primary employer with whom the union has a
dispute are distributed by a neutral employer.
If the Supreme Court holds that the handblling was
protected by the Act or the First Amendment, this could
result In neutral retailers becoming enmeshed In labor
disputes over which they have no control or influence. On
the other hand, If the Court holds the handblling was
unprotected, then unions will be deprived of an Important
means of asking the public for support in labor disputes.
Because this case raises the question of what limits the
First Amendment places on Congress' power to regulate
economic activity, the Supreme Court's decision may have an
Impact on the issue of regulating cigarette and alcoholic
beverage advertising.
ARGUMENTS
For the EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. (Counsel of Record,
Lawrence M. Cohen, 233 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 781.
Chicago, IL 60606 telephone (312) 8760500)
1. The prohibition of section 8(b)(4)(I)(B) encompasses
Issue No. 7 203
coercive secondary conduct not protected by the publici-
ty proviso.
2. The regulation of coercive unprotected secondary con-
duct Imposes no impermissible restriction upon constitu-
tionally protected speech.
For the National Labor Relations Board Supporting e
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. (Counsel, Glen D. Nager,
Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone
(202) 633-2217)
1. A union "threatens, coerces, or restrains" a neutral em-
ployer within the meaning of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act when It distributes handbills urging a total
consumer boycott of a neutral employer's business.
2. The Act, as applied to the union's handbilllng, does not
violate the First Amendment.
For the Florida Gulf Coast Buidng and Constructon
Trades CouncUl (Council of Record, Laurence Gold, 815
16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006, telephone (202)
637.5390)
1. Section 8(b)(4)(ii) (B) should be interpreted as limiting
secondary messages through means, such as picketing,
deemed to exert a coercive influence independent of the
communication's content.
2. If section 8(b)(4)(B) were construed to provide for a
restraint on non-picketing communications by unions
truthfully informing members of the general public about
a labor dispute and urging the public to take lawful action
in that dispute, the statute would violate the First
Amendment.
AMICUS ARGUMENTh
In Support of the EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed a
brief arguing that consumer boycotts are coercive and may
be prohibited, whether induced by handbilling or otherwise.
According to another amtct the American Retail Federa-
tion, handbilling by a labor union as a part of a secondary
boycott Is not entitled to the same protection as political
speech lying at the core of the First Amendment.
In Support of Florida Guff Coast Building Trades Cours-
ci4 AFL-aO
The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation filed a
brief asserting that handbilling urging a secondary boycott by
consumers is speech protected by the First Amendment.
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